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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*****************************************

JAN H. PETERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

No- 17289

JUDITH ANN PETERSON,
Defendant-Respondent.
*****************************************

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by the Defendant-Respondent
against the Plaintiff-Appellant in a proceeding to reinstate alimony in the divorce decree following an annulment.

Both the ori-

ginal divorce decree and the annulment involved the same parties.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court Judge, G. HAL TAYLOR, after hearing
the evidence concluded that the alimony under the divorce decree
should be reinstated and that the life insurance policy should be
maintained naming the Defendant-Respondent as beneficiary.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent

seeks an Order

from

this Court

upholding the trial court's Order reinstating alimony under her
prior divorce decree.
(1)
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties to this action originally married in 1967
and remained married ,for eleven years*

In June, 1978, the Plain-

tiff-Appellant, JAN H. PETERSON, filed

an action

for divorce

against the Defendant-Respondent, JUDITH ANN PETERSON, (R 2-4).
The case was finally settled by Stipulation between the parties
and the Plaintiff-Appellant agreed to pay to the Defendant-Respondent the sum of $250 per month as alimony (R 5-16).

At the

time of the divorce, the Plaintiff-Appellant's income was $1,000
per month net (R 77) and at the time of the reinstatement hearing
his net earnings were $1,024.94 (R 88).

The Plaintiff-Appel-

lant's expenses had decreased as a result of his payoff of numerous of the financial obligations which existed at the time of
the divorce (R 128).

The Defendant-Respondent had no income at

the time of the divorce.

At the time of the hearing for rein-

statement of alimony she was on public assistance, receiving $253
per month (R 95, 105).

Defendant-Respondent further indicated

that her expenses had substantially increased between the time of
the divorce and the time of the reinstatement hearing (R 93).
On May 20, 1979, the parties remarried and lived together as husband and wife for two weeks (R 85).

On July 16,

1979, the Defendant-Respondent herein filed a complaint for annulment in Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. D79-2818.
The annulment proceeding went forward on a Stipulation, Waiver,
(2)
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and Consent signed
August 21, 1979.

by Plaintiff-Appellant

and was entered on

No appeal was ever filed from said decree.

The

trial court took judicial notice of and was familiar with the annulment action (R 75-76).
Subsequently, the Defendant-Respondent herein filed a
motion in the Third Judicial District Court for reinstatement of
the alimony under the divprce decree.

The matter was heard be-

fore the Honorable Judge, G. HAL TAYLOR, of the Third Judicial
District Court who after hearing the evidence ruled in favor of
Defendant-Respondent and reinstated the alimony.

From this de-

cision, the Plaintiff-Appellant has filed this appeal.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT IS GIVEN CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION IN
DECIDING FAMILY MATTERS, AND NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS SHOWN BY
APPELLANT.
This case comes to the Supreme Court on review of a
discretionary ruling.
Ferguson v. Ferguson,

In accordance with the holding of the
546

P.2d

1380

(1977),

this

Court

has

granted the trial court responsibility to exercise its sound
discretion

in ordering

reinstatement of alimony upon consid-

eration of all of the circumstances presented at the trial.
(3)
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In

conformance with that decision, the Defendant-Respondent herein
filed a Motion for Reinstatement of Alimony under the prior de-

m

cree and the Court having heard all of the evidence presented by
the parties, concluded that reinstatement of alimony under the
circumstances was equitable,

|

This Court in Maple v. Mapley 566 P.2d 1229 (1977) f in
reviewing an appeal from an annulment stated its general rule of
(

review:
w

In reviewing the findings and order made pursuant to an
annulment under the authorization of statute quoted
above (UCA, Section 30-1-17.2), the rule of review by
this Court is the same as in other family problems. Due
to the trial court's advantaged position and responsibilities, we indulge him considerable latitude of discretion and do not disagree therewith and upset his judgment unless it appears that there has been a plain abuse
thereof." (Id. at p. 1230)
The sole issue raised by Plaintiff-Appellant's relies
on an assumption that the trial court misinterrupted the Findings
and Conclusions of Judge Winder in the annulment proceedings between the parties.
cord.

This assumption is not supported by the re-

The trial judge stated he had read the annulment file and

he was familiar with it (R 75-76).

Defendant-Respondent asserts

that the Findings and Conclusions of the annulment so far as the
grounds were concerned were inmaterial to the issues presented by
this appeal and the Court's Findings of Fact issued in support of
its decision herein were clearly supported by the evidence presented by the parties at the hearing herein.

The Plaintiff-

Appellant has clearly failed in its burden to demonstrate any
(4)
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\ <

plain abuse of discretion by the trial court.

POINT II,

THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ALIMONY IN
THE ANNULMENT PROCEEDING AND THE REINSTATEMENT OF ALIMONY WAS
CLEARLY EQUITABLE.

The provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-117.2
provide certain criteria under which a Court in an annulment
proceeding

may

grant maintenance

or

alimony

to

the parties.

Those conditions are as follows:
1.

The parties have accummulated any property or ac-

quired any obligations.
2.

There

is

a geniune

need

arising

from

economic

change of circumstances due to the marriage.
3.

There are children born or expected.

During the second marriage of the parties, they lived together
only two weeks (R 85).

The trial court herein specifically found

that none of the above criteria were met in this case and that
the Defendant-Respondent was not entitled to alimony under the
narrow scope of the annulment statute (R 57-58).

Therefore, her

sole remedy was to petition the Court for reinstatement of the
alimony

as provided

by

this Court

in the Ferguson

(5)
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decision

(Supra).
In Ferguson (Supra) this Court reviewed this issue in
light of two prior cases of Kent v. Kent, 28 U.2d 334, 497 P.2d
652 (1972) and Cecil v. Cecil, 11 U.2d 155, 356 P.2d 279 (I960),
In Ferguson, the Court substantially altered the direction of the
prior two named cases which seemed to hold that upon the annulment of the subsequent marriage, the prior alimony decree was
automatically reinstated.

The Court in Ferguson opted for a more

liberal rule which would not be regarded as absolute but which
rather required the parties to obtain Court review of the circumstances in an equitable determination as to whether the alimony
should be reinstated.

The Court in Ferguson held:

"Upon proper application of the District Court invoking
its continuing jurisdiction, it should be free to proceed in conformity with its general equitable powers
upon these generally sound proposition; that when a wife
remarries, her right to receive alimony under the divorce decree from her former husband should terminate,
and that an annulment of subsequent marriage should not
automatically restore the alimony under the prior decree.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court may
exercise its sound discretion in ordering the reinstatement of the alimony in the prior decree if, upon its
consideration of all the circumstances, it appears
clearly and persuasively that that is necessary to rectify serious inequity or injustice." (Id. at p. 1383)
In this case, the Court heard evidence relative to the
equitable considerations involved in this particular situation.
The Court specifically found that since the original divorce decree the wife's (Defendantfs-Respondentfs) health had deteriorated, that she had a physical condition which was a serious limitation on her ability to work; that the husband's (Plaintiff!s(6)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant's) income was substantially the same; that the attempted marriage of the parties did not adversely alter nor change
the Plaintiffs-Appellant's

circumstances so that it would be

inequitable to require him to continue his alimony payments.
It is further obvious from the facts that none of the
fears delineated in the Ferguson case apply here.

The Plaintiff-

Appellant participated in the marriage and no circumstances were
left dangling which were uncertain to him.
fluence and control over this marriage.

He had constant in-

His wife was not in a

position as a result of the remarriage to collude with her later
spouse for the purpose of restoring alimony by entering into an
annulment proceeding since the new marriage herein was between
the same parties.
Furthermore, the evidence introduced at the trial herein

indicated

that

the husband

(Plaintiff-Appellant) had very

nearly engaged in the hyp.othetical situation discussed in Ferguson as follows:
"Assume, for example, a situation where a wife of many
years had reared a family, was divorced under ever so
just and proper decree awarding her alimony; and because
of disability, age, or for any reason was unable to make
a livelihood. Assume further that a husband, motivated
by animosity or avarice that sometimes exist, procures
an accomplice to connive in a nefarious scheme for the
accomplice to persuade the wife to marry him, with a
preconceived design of getting the marriage annulled.
This for the purpose of effecting the automatic terminate of the husband's obligation to pay alimony. Assume that this plan is carried out. Should the wife be
left an object of charity or public welfare? The possibility of unconscionable imposition and of injustice is
obvious." (Id at p.1382)
(7)
-A
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In this case, the Plaintiff-Appellant rather than procuring an accomplice to marry his former wife in a scheme to terminate the alimony; persuaded her by duress, threats, and physical violence to remarry him.

The subsequent annulment was heard

by Judge Winder and he was convinced upon facts presented at the
annulment hearing

that, in fact, the marriage was induced by

fraud and an annulment decree was entered and never appealled
from.

This is res judicata on the issue of fradulent inducement

of the Plaintiff-Appellant (husband) inducing the Defendant-Respondent (wife) to marry him the second time.

As soon as this

scheme became apparent to Defendant-Respondent, she immediately
filed for and received the annulment.

Indeed, if the Plaintiff-

Appellant is allowed to benefit as a result of this fraud and
coercion, others will be encouraged to employ the same or similar
schemes.
In summary, the equities as demonstrated by the facts
presented to the trial court clearly favor a reinstatement of the
alimony and public policy would seem best served by discouraging
fraudulently induced marriages for the sole purpose of terminating alimony under a prior decree.

Furthermore, public policy

would also seem better served by encouraging parties to attempt
reconcilliation of prior marriages by retaining for each party
the opportunity

to maintain the status quo

subsequent marriage fails.

in the event the

If Plaintiff-Appellant! s position is

adopted as the rule of law in this state, then indeed, subsequent
(8)
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marriages between spouses impose a substantial risk on the wife
who stands to lose her prior alimony award if the subsequent remarriage fails.
Plaintiff-Appellant erroneously confuses the issue of
res judicata with the availability of the Defendant-Respondent to
obtain alimony in her annulment proceeding.

Plaintiff-Appellant

asserted at trial that Defendant-Respondent's failure to ask for
alimony in her annulment proceeding, constituted res judicata and
she was barred from seeking reinstatement of alimony under her
prior

divorce.

In making

this

argument, Plaintiff-Appellant

fails to recognize that the availability of obtaining alimony in
annulment proceedings is narrow (i.e. only under specified criteria) and the trial court in this case, specifically, held that
none of the criteria set forth in Utah Code Annotated, Section
30-1-17.2 were met (R 57-58).

Therefore, the alimony was not

available to Defendant-Respondent in said proceeding.

Plaintiff-

Appellant erroneously concludes that the unavailability of alimony in the annulment proceeding is a complete bar to alimony reinstatement under Ferguson decision.
Furthermore, the

Plaintiff-Appellant

erroneously as-

serts that the decision of the trial court should be overturned
because of failure to hear evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the remarriage and annulment.

This position is taken in

light of the fact that Plaintiff-Appellant made no proffer of
proof on that issue.

At the trial, Plaintiff-Appellant only at(9)
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tempted to introduce evidence of Defendant1s-Respondent's "attitude", "veracity", "animosity", and "vindictiveness" (Rill).

The

court, over objection by Defendant-Respondent, heard the evidence
offered and then concluded that it had no probative value to the
issue before the court (R113).

No further evidence of circum-

stances surrounding

the marriage and annulment was offered by

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Ironically, the Plaintiff-Appellant object-

ed to Defendant1s-Respondent1s attempt to introduce such evidence
and

the

Court' sustained

(R83-84).

Plaintiff's-Appellantfs

objection

Plaintiff-Appellant is now taking the position that

the Court erred by sustaining his own objection!

CONCLUSION
In this matter, the trial court sitting in equity heard
evidence offered by both parties concerning facts and circumstances justifying the reinstatement of alimony by the PlaintiffAppellant.

The Court concluded that the annulment did not in-

equitably alter the original situation between the parties as
both, parties participated

in the affair.

The Court concluded

that the Plaintiff-Appellant was as capable of paying alimony at
the time of the hearing as he was prior to the remarriage and at
the time of the divorce.

The needs of the Defendant-Respondent

for alimony were increased due to her limited working capacity.
The conclusions reached by the Court are clearly supported by the
facts presented at the hearing; are clearly consistent with the
(10)
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Ferguson holding

and do not

involve an abuse of discretion;

hencef the decision of the lower Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this /$j£.

day of March, 1981.

RAJ
4^55 Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Attorney for DefendantRespondent
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were mailed to CRAIG S. COOK, 3645 East 3100
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 and to JAY E. MESERVY, 820
Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
{

Plaintiff-Appellant, on this

84111, Attorneys for

/>

/^^L?

day of March, 1981.

LINDA A. TABOR, Secretary
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